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We explore the history of cognitive research in information systems (IS) across three major research streams in 
which cognitive processes are of paramount importance: developing software, decision support, and human-
computer interaction. Through our historical analysis, we identify “enduring questions” in each area. The 
enduring questions motivated long-standing areas of inquiry within a particular research stream. These 
questions, while perhaps unapparent to the authors cited, become evident when one adopts an historical 
perspective. While research in all three areas was influenced by changes in technologies, research techniques, 
and the contexts of use, these enduring questions remain fundamental to our understanding of how to 
develop, reason with, and interact with IS. In synthesizing common themes across the three streams, we draw 
out four cognitive qualities of information technology: interactivity, fit, cooperativity, and affordances. Together 
these cognitive qualities reflect IT’s ability to influence cognitive processes and ultimately task performance.  
Extrapolating from our historical analysis and looking at the operation of these cognitive qualities in concert, we 
envisage a bright future for cognitive research in IS: a future in which the study of cognition in IS extends 
beyond the individual to consider cognition distributed across teams, communities and systems, and a future 
involving the study of rich and dynamic social and organizational contexts in which the interplay between 
cognition, emotion, and attitudes provides a deeper explanation of behavior with IS. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1977, several landmark events occurred in the information systems (IS) discipline. MIS Quarterly 
was established as one of the first journals dedicated to the new field. Management Science 
published the “Minnesota experiments” paper (Dickson, Senn, & Chervany, 1977), since cited more 
than 250 times (Harzing, 2011). While MIS Quarterly is hallowed as a premier journal in the field, 
research from a cognitive perspective, such as the Minnesota experiments, has not received such 
broad recognition. Yet, nearly a quarter of all recipients of AIS Fellow awards1
 
 pursued a cognitive-
related topic in their PhD program. Our purpose here is to explore the evolution of cognitive research 
in IS, and in so doing, identify its future directions and potential for contribution. Consistent with calls 
to focus on the IT artifact in IS research (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001), much  
cognitive research in IS has centered on the IT artifact. With a focus on the IT artifact, and history to 
the early days of the field, an historical analysis of cognitive research in IS provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the evolution of IS research with an eye to the future. 
The term “cognitive psychology” was coined by Neisser (1967), who describes cognition as “the 
activity of knowing: the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge” (Neisser, 1976, p. 1).  
Cognition entails both knowledge structures (organization) and processes (acquisition and use) that 
occur within a given of (human) cognitive architecture (e.g., short-term vs. long-term memory, and so 
forth). In parallel, an IS can be viewed as an IT artifact for the “acquisition, organization and use of 
knowledge”. Cognitive psychology is, thus, of fundamental relevance to IS, indeed it is sometimes 
referred to as information processing psychology. 
 
In our exploration of past cognitive research within IS and the future possibilities it offers, we are 
cognizant of what Weber (2003) calls the “error of inclusion” – researching questions that are part of 
the reference discipline rather than IS.  Our interest is the advancement of IS as a discipline, not of 
cognitive psychology. Therefore, while we may borrow insight, theory, and methods from a reference 
discipline, we must address phenomena “that are not the focus of other disciplines” or “applications of 
theories from other disciplines or straightforward extensions of these theories” (Weber, 2003, p. vi).  
Our interest is to understand IS phenomena where it overlaps with cognition. However, one could 
argue that nearly any IS study investigates cognition, given that information and using it seem to 
imply cognitive activities of some nature. Hence, we focus on studies that employ cognitive theories 
and explanations for IS phenomena. 
 
What then is the scope of cognitive research in IS, and our history in particular? In defining the scope 
of psychology, James (1950, p.3), notes about the mind: “the faculty does not exist absolutely, but 
works under conditions and the quest of the conditions becomes the psychologist’s most interesting 
task”. In a similar vein, cognitive research in IS explores the interactions between cognition and 
context that influence behaviors and outcomes in the development and use of IS. We discuss the 
issue of scope further in the next section when we develop our framework for understanding cognition 
and information systems. 
 
Our historical analysis is not the same as a comprehensive review (the span of cognitive research in 
IS would easily fill a book). Rather, we seek to identify, through retrospective analysis, enduring IS 
questions in which cognition plays a central role. By enduring IS questions, we mean fundamental 
issues that have motivated various studies regarding cognition and IS. We identify these enduring 
questions through our retrospective analysis and find that they provide a useful means to organize 
cognitive research in IS. Further, given their historical significance and long-lasting nature, they allow 
us to provide advice about future cognitive research in IS. As a matter of scope we concern ourselves 
principally with questions that have implications for the design and use of IS because these are lines 
of inquiry where cognition has been particularly relevant. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we first present our organizing frameworks for exploring cognition in IS.  
                                                     
1 For example: Benbasat, Ein-dor, El-Sawy, Galletta, Ives, Liang, Munro, Te’eni, Vessey, and Weber 
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Second, we analyze the history of cognitive research in IS for each of the three streams derived from 
the structure of our organizing frameworks: development, decision support, and human-computer 
interaction. We then synthesize and reflect on the historical contributions to IS cognitive research.  
We conclude with a speculative exploration of the future of cognitive research in IS by extrapolating 
from our historical observations. 
2. A Framework for Exploring Cognitive Research in IS 
2.1. Information Systems as Representations 
We develop our historical analysis of cognitive research in IS with an organizing framework that 
draws on an established conceptualization of IS (i.e., Wand & Weber, 1990) and a widely-cited model 
of human information processing (i.e., Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983).  Because we are interested in 
advancing IS research, we begin with defining our perspective on IS. We consider the IS artifact as a 
representation of some underlying reality (Wand & Weber, 1990; Weber, 2003).  “Representation” is a 
critical aspect of the well-known theory of cognitive fit (Vessey & Galletta, 1991). Mental 
representations also play a central role in the model of human information processing that we adopt 
from cognitive psychology. The description of problem solving provided by the “paradigm of cognitive 
fit” (Vessey & Galletta, 1991, p. 66) is helpful to understanding our framework: 
 
The basic model views problem solving as the outcome of the relationship between the 
problem or external representation and the problem solving task, which are 
characterized for the purposes of this analysis by the type of information emphasized … 
processes act on information in (1) the problem representation and (2) the problem 
solving task, to produce the mental representation; and (3) the mental representation to 
produce the problem solution. The mental or (internal representation) is the way the 
problem solver represents the problem in human-working memory. 
 
The term representation can, thus, refer to an internal (mental) representation or an external 
representation. The “external representation” in this context is the manner in which information is 
presented to a user of an information system. Figure 1 depicts our organizing framework that 
expands on the notion of information systems as representations in a manner consistent with the 
“human information processor” model (Card et al., 1983) of cognition (as discussed below). 
 
 
Figure 1. An Organizing Framework for Exploring Cognition with Information Systems 
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As shown in Figure 1, we distinguish developing an IS representation from use of a representation, 
although in many contexts the stages are intertwined. We further distinguish between two levels of 
use: the task level and the tool level (following Davern, 1996, 2007; Moran, 1981; Te’eni, Carey, & 
Zhang, 2007). At the task level, the System Representation (i.e., the information system as 
representation in Weber’s sense of the term) is comprehended, manipulated, and tested to reason, 
solve problems, and act. For example, a task level activity could be consumer decision making, an 
activity that has proliferated in studies of online shopping.  At the tool level, the (computerized) tool is 
used to view and manipulate the “presentation” of the underlying system representation to support the 
task level: for example, online graphics or color (tool level) to support decision making (task level). In 
addition, there are the corresponding internal mental representations 2
2.2. A Model of Cognition: The Human Information Processor 
 of the users and the 
developers (shown in the clouds in Figure 1). From the perspective of distributed cognition, there are 
also representations in the minds of others in the social context (Hutchins, 1995; Asch, 1952) of use.  
For simplicity we do not show the social context of users in Figure 1. However, as our ensuing 
discussion reveals, social context and the manner in which cognition is distributed across a group of 
users and IT artifacts is an area that should be of increasing focus for cognitive research in IS. 
As noted above, our framework also reflects a cognitive model.  We adapt Card et al.’s (1983) model of 
the human information processor (HIP), which comprises three subsystems.  The Perceptual System 
“carries sensations of the physical world detected by the body’s sensory systems into internal 
representations of the mind by means of integrated sensory systems.” (Card et al., 1983, p. 25).  The 
Motor System is where “thought is finally translated into action” (Card et al., 1983, p. 34).  Finally, the 
Cognitive System “connects the inputs from the perceptual system to the right outputs of the motor 
system” (Card et al., 1983, p. 35). The cognitive system, which appears simple, is more complicated 
than the other systems, as it involves learning, recall of knowledge, and use of the knowledge to solve a 
problem (Card et al., 1983). In the HIP model, “internal representations” are central to cognition. 
 
We employ Card et al.’s (1983) model as an organizing framework3
 
 to identify relevant constructs and 
concepts in a broader picture of HIP enabled by information systems (see Table 1).  In adapting Card 
et al.’s model for our historical analysis, we focus primarily on the cognitive system, but recognize 
perception as the source of input to cognition, and use the term “action” instead of motor system, 
since in an IS setting, the results of cognition are not exclusively motoric. 
Notably, the model portrayed in Table 1 extends Card et al.’s (1983) model beyond the individual 
level of analysis. We follow Hutchins (1990, 1991, 1995) in the use of the term “Distributed Cognition” 
to describe “the process of thinking as extending beyond the individual … either across members of a 
group or in concert with objects and tools in the environment” (Gureckis & Goldstone, 2006, p. 293).  
The term includes but does not require knowledge sharing (and, hence, subsumes “shared 
cognition”). A distributed cognition view recognizes the collaborative nature of cognitive tasks, 
whether that collaboration is between a single individual and system or a group of individuals and 
systems. It may involve communication and sharing of representations between individuals, the 
development of shared representations (e.g., cognitively: shared mental models, physically: boundary 
objects).  Alternatively, it may involve a coordination of cognitive activities that entails a 
representation distributed across individuals and systems but in which no one individual or system 
has the “complete” picture. As our history of cognitive research in IS reveals distributed cognition, 
with its consideration of knowledge sharing, social context and collaborative task performance is very 
much “a new foundation” for cognitive research in IS (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsch, 2000, p. 174). 
                                                     
2 The role of mental representation in cognition has been the “subject of a lively debate in cognitive science for many years” 
(Thornton, 2009, p. 1383). Ontologically, the term “mental representation” refers to an observer construct, i.e., an explanatory 
device rather than something that necessarily exists in the head of an individual. Indeed, we make no claims as to physical 
implementation of cognitive constructs, as our reference discipline is cognitive psychology rather than neuroscience. Thus, 
following Neisser (1976, p. 11), we recognize that “perception and cognition are usually not just operations in the head but 
transactions in the world”, and our scope includes aspects of distributed cognition as discussed below. 
3 As a model, its validity against alternatives can be debated. As an organizing framework, the presence of alternatives does not 
detract from its usefulness in the context of the design and use of information systems. As Card et al. (1983) remark “[i]ts function 
is synthesis, not discrimination of alternative underlying mechanisms”.   
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Table 1. An Adaption and Extension of the Human Information Processor Model 
Individual Level Beyond the Individual 
Individual Level Beyond the Individual Individual Level 
Perception Attention Perception 
Cognition Mental Representations: 
• Learning and memory (of 
representations) 
• Knowledge (as 
representations) 
• Reasoning (with 
representations) 
Distributed Cognition: 
• Knowledge sharing (sharing 
representations) 
• Transactive memory (shared 
representations) 





Group consensus and choice 
2.3. Summary: From Framework to Research Streams 
As shown in Figure 1, the concept of representation is central as we explicitly consider developer’s 
mental representations and user’s mental representations, in addition to the IS as representation. 
Thus, we frame our historical analysis of cognitive research in IS into three interconnected streams of 
research: the development of “representations” (e.g., the cognitive processes of developers), (task 
level) reasoning with “representations” (i.e., decision support), and the (tool level) interface with 
“representations” (i.e., human-computer interaction (HCI)). In our review, all three aspects of research 
on representations appeared in major IS journals. As a matter of scope, our historical analysis has 
focused primarily on mainstream IS journals, although obviously, we look more broadly in the early 
days prior to the establishment of IS discipline-specific outlets. 
 
Clearly, good cognitive research in IS should be informed by and build on theory and methods in the 
foundational cognitive and psychological literature. However our historical analysis reflects the 
evolution of cognitive research in IS, not cognition research more broadly. We recognize that in 
parallel with the evolution of IS research, cognitive research also evolves, but we consider this 
evolution from the perspective of IS research. Our rationale is twofold here. First, this is an IS history 
written for IS researchers interested in IS phenomena, rather than for cognitive researchers interested 
in IS as a context for cognitive research. Second, not surprisingly, in our historical investigations we 
found that the evolution of cognitive research in IS has been primarily driven by the challenges and 
questions arising in IS, rather than by advances in cognitive theory and method.  As such, IS is the 
source of these questions, whereas the cognitive literature is a source of useful theory and methods 
for addressing these questions. Although advances in theory and method allow us to address IS 
questions sometimes in new and different ways (e.g., as in the current interest in Neuro IS), the 
driving and enduring questions are always about IS. This is as much a matter of pragmatics and 
socialization: cognitive researchers in IS are on the whole first and foremost IS researchers, not 
cognitive researchers4
                                                     
4 This is evident in even a cursory examination of the publication records of cognitive IS researchers – unsurprisingly, they tend to 
publish more in IS journals than the underlying reference discipline. 
. Thus, in our ensuing analysis of cognitive research in the three streams, while 
we identify the cognitive foundations that have informed the IS research, we focus on the evolution of 
enduring IS questions as the “landmarks” in our navigation through history. 
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3. Cognition in Software Development 
3.1. Scope 
The study of cognition during software development has been referred to as software psychology, 
which stresses the scientific study, modeling, and measurement of human behavior in creating or 
using software systems (Shneiderman, 1979). Creating a software system is fundamentally a 
cognitive endeavor; software itself has been described as “pure thought-stuff, infinitely malleable” 
(Brooks, 1987, p. 12).  By implication, software is an outgrowth of human cognition.  Consistent with 
our framework (Figure 1) the studies in this area reflect an interest in the representations of software 
developers.  Early researchers did not usually directly investigate developers’ mental representations.  
Instead, they focused on performance, as the end result of the mental representations implicit to 
conducting these tasks. Sackman, Erikson, and Grant’s (1968) study of debugging performance 
differences between on-line and off-line environments would likely be considered the first empirical 
study in this area. Their results highlighted substantial variance between subjects and they, therefore, 
called for future research focused on “programmer problem-solving”. Early studies of software 
developers addressed this call through a focus on tools and techniques to facilitate software 
development. These studies typically made limited use of psychological theories, which may have 
been due to the emerging state of cognitive psychology (the term being coined by Neisser, 1967).  
Early studies of software developers drew from psychological research in their use of experimental 
methods.  As we note below, as theories of cognition became more developed, cognitive research on 
software development better incorporated such theories. 
3.2. Facilitating Software Development, Implementation, and 
Maintenance 
The earliest studies of cognition during software development sought to understand how to facilitate 
the cognition of software developers.  The investigations focused on how different programming 
constructs, tools, practices, and so forth enabled the cognition necessary to conduct a programming-
related task.  The implication was that different techniques were better or worse at supporting the 
cognitive processes of programmers engaged in tasks such as constructing a program, debugging, 
maintenance, and comprehension.  Studies of software development techniques focus on reasoning 
with representations (see Table 1) in that development techniques are typically embodied as 
representations.  Consider a Data-Flow Diagram (DFD) or Use-Case Diagram, either would be 
considered a representation.  Even different coding practices, in essence, reflect guidance on how to 
rely upon the program itself as a representation.  Software development can be seen as creating 
representations (such as DFDs, data models, etc.) and transforming those representations into a 
representation that is machine executable (i.e., the program code).  Software developers rely upon 
internal mental representations to create and work with these more physical representations (e.g., 
DFDs, flowcharts). 
 
Studies investigating programming factors, tools, and practices dominated this area from the late 
1960s to early 1980s.  Sackman et al.’s (1968) study of debugging performance, noted above, was 
motivated by the then new technological capability of working on-line rather than off-line.  Citing 
Sackman et al. extensively, Weinberg (1971) argued that to understand “the psychology of 
programming” merited extensive research using a variety of approaches (e.g., introspection, 
observation, experiments, etc.). As structured programming techniques became prominent, 
investigations focused on factors such as programming language constructs (e.g., nested conditional 
constructs) (Sheppard, Curtis, Milliman, & Love, 1979); the role of programming support tools (e.g., 
testing, flowcharting, and so forth) (Shneiderman, Mayer, McKay, & Heller, 1977); and programming 
practices (e.g., commenting, variable naming, indenting, and so forth) (Shniederman, 1976).  These 
studies only occasionally assessed cognition directly, such as Sheppard et al.’s (1979) reliance on 
free recall data to assess program comprehension.  Instead, task performance (e.g., programming, 
debugging, and so forth) was examined to indicate which techniques better enabled programmers to 
conduct the cognitively complex work of software development. That is, programmers performed 
better due to improved cognitive processing per the factors manipulated in an experiment such as the 
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presence of code comments, variable naming practices, and the like. These early studies typically 
lacked a strong theoretical grounding, focusing instead on investigating current software development 
practices. Hence, the motivation was the on-going evolution of IS practice. 
 
As structured development (SD) expanded to consider modeling techniques for earlier phases of 
development (Gane & Sarson, 1979), research reflected this evolution (e.g., Vessey & Weber, 1986).  
In the 1990s, the emergence of object-oriented development (OOD) was a catalyst for inquiry.  
Several studies focused on comparing object-oriented analysis (OOA) to SD approaches (Agarwal, 
Sinha, & Tanniru, 1996; Wang, 1996). These studies examined requirements modelling, comparing 
participants’ ability to create representations in the two techniques. Wang (1996) conducted an 
exploratory study of the cognitive processes used during OOA v. SD via protocol analysis.  Agarwal 
et al. (1996) relied upon the theory of cognitive fit (Vessey & Galletta, 1991), one of the first cognitive 
theories developed within IS, to argue that OOA and SD approaches are differentially suited to 
particular application domains. They contrasted performance on the OOA and SD tasks, and their 
results supported their arguments. Hence, one could not conclude that one approach was always 
superior with regard to the cognitive task of developing software models. 
 
The standardization of data modeling representations motivated studies similar to those observed in 
SD. Within the data modeling stream, early studies focused on physical database design (Prietula & 
March, 1991). To understand how software developers create data models, Srinivasan and Te’eni 
(1995) analyzed verbal protocol data. They identified several heuristics used to manage the 
complexity of developing data models. 
 
Ontological analysis, a refinement of philosophy of science arguments (Wand & Weber, 1993, 2002) 
serves as the theoretical underpinning for many data modeling studies. These studies frequently 
examined how well predictions based upon ontological arguments are consistent with the cognitive 
realities of software development – such as developing conceptual models or facilitating 
understanding.  One motivation for ontologies is that if “phenomena are classified correctly according 
to the theory, humans will be better able to understand and predict the phenomena and thus work 
more effectively and efficiently with the phenomena” (Wand & Weber, 2004, p. iv). Hence, although 
one might argue that ontological analysis is not itself a cognitive theory, it has motivated many studies 
to ascertain if models based upon ontological principles support the cognitive processes of software 
developers and others who interact with an IS.  As data modeling and ontological analysis matured, 
studies focused on more precise issues such as whether or not attributes and entities should be 
modeled distinctly based on whether database designers cognitively distinguish them (Weber, 1996) 
or whether modeling optionality supports designers’ cognitions (Bodart, Patel, Sim, & Weber, 2001). 
 
As our understanding of software developers’ cognitive processes has evolved, researchers have 
taken more pro-active approaches. Rather than responding to trends in practice, some suggested 
practices based upon cognitive theory. Kim, Hahn, and Hahn (2000) modified OO modeling practices 
to incorporate additional visual cues and contextual information. These modifications were to facilitate 
perceptual and conceptual integration based on the theory of diagrammatic reasoning (Larkin & 
Simon, 1987) to help developers integrate information dispersed across multiple diagrams. From 
verbal protocols, participants relied upon visual cues and contextual information to construct more 
comprehensive mental representations, resulting in higher levels of problem solving performance. 
 
From these studies, there appears to be a progression from studying programming and physical 
design to studying tasks that occur earlier in the systems development life cycle (i.e., early research 
often focused on coding and debugging, later studies considered requirements modeling). However, 
software design has been under investigated (relative to other software development phases) by the 
IS community; although many software design studies appear in cognitive science publications (see 
also Détienne, 2002). Instead, the focus has been on modeling (both data and process), perhaps 
because these activities are more closely related to the business (problem solving) than the 
implementation (computing) domain. 
 
Current trends in software development, including test-driven and agile development, have not yet 
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focused on how these techniques facilitate or influence software developers’ cognitions (we comment 
on pair programming later). While we do not advocate following trends per se, it seems appropriate to 
investigate evolving development techniques to understand how they support developers’ cognitive 
processes and if they do so in ways that are superior to existing techniques. Such research informs 
managerial questions regarding which changes in development approaches merit the expense and 
effort to alter development practices. We summarize the above with the following research question: 
 
DEV-RQ1: How can different software development techniques facilitate cognition of 
developers in the building and maintenance of representations? 
3.3. The Role of Specialized Knowledge 
Developing software requires extensive knowledge (Sheil, 1981). Many studies have focused on 
understanding how specialized knowledge enables software developers’ cognitive processes while 
engaged in software development activities. These studies seek to understand developers’ mental 
representations (Figure 1), and their knowledge (Table 1). The focus on the knowledge required to 
conduct software development tasks has spanned the phases of the software development life cycle.   
Studies of software developers’ specialized knowledge were first conducted by cognitive 
psychologists, who began to study computer programmers in the late 1970s. In this context, 
programming was often a mechanism to understand higher-order (problem solving) cognitive 
processes rather than as a means to improve programmer productivity or software development 
processes. These studies provided both empirical results and theoretical models that could be applied 
to IS studies. Other studies of software developers’ knowledge structures investigated the cognitive 
processes of developing a program, which also encompasses aspects of software design (Jeffries, 
Turner, Polson, & Atwood, 1981; Rist, 1989). These studies focused on how software developers use 
existing plans or schemas to develop computer programs and sometimes varied expertise in 
programming and or domain knowledge (Adelson & Soloway, 1985; Solloway & Ehrlich, 1984). 
 
Perhaps the earliest IS study that focused on the role of specialized knowledge was Vitalari’s (1985) 
investigation of systems analysts that identified six major areas of knowledge (core system analysis, 
high-rated domain, application domain, organization specific, methods, and techniques). These areas 
were identified from verbal protocols collected while analysts determined requirements from a narrative. 
 
In a similar vein, but at what one might consider the opposite end of the software development life 
cycle, Nelson, Nadkami, Narayanan, and Ghods (2000) relied upon revealed causal maps developed 
from individual interviews to identify the knowledge and expertise involved in software operations 
support (maintenance and related activities). They identified personal competencies, environmental 
factors, support personnel motivation, IS policies, and support personnel outcomes as important 
areas of knowledge that these software personnel rely upon to conduct maintenance work. These 
studies highlight the variety of knowledge required. 
 
Both IS researchers and cognitive psychologists compared expert and novice programmers.  Studies 
of novice-expert differences across domains (i.e., chess, physics, and programming) conclude that 
experts: 
 
1. Chunk information into familiar patterns and experts’ chunks are larger than those of novices 
(McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981). 
 
2. Use a deep structure to organize their knowledge base, whereas novices use surface 
features to organize information (Adelson, 1981; McKeithen et al., 1981).  
 
3. Work forward to solve a program, whereas novices work backward, setting sub-goals.  
 
Anderson (1995) notes that some studies find that expert programmers deviate from the third 
conclusion in that they work in a top-down fashion, refining the problem into successive sub-
problems. This is considered analogous to working backward. However, expert programmers work in 
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a breadth-first fashion (filling in an entire level).  Novices work depth-first, working down to the lowest-
level of a particular sub-problem then returning to the higher level. One possible explanation for this 
distinction between expert programmers and other experts is that programmers frequently apply their 
skills in a variety of problem domains. As such they may never become expert enough in any 
particular domain to work forward completely when developing a program. Programmers require 
extensive interaction with a program to develop a functional representation, which is more consistent 
with the real-world than the programming domain (Pennington, 1987). The difficulty that programmers 
experience in developing a mental representation of the problem domain may explain why even 
expert programmers do not work forward. 
 
To explore the role of expertise in software development, Vessey (1985) developed a theory of 
debugging expertise via protocol analysis.  Vessey found that only novices used a depth-first strategy to 
debugging.  Although both novice and expert debuggers were observed to use a breadth-first approach, 
expert debuggers also created an overall model of system structure.  Schenk, Vitalari, and Davis (1998) 
investigated novice and expert systems analysts.  Novice system analysts made fewer domain specific 
references. Novices and experts also managed problem-solving hypotheses differently (i.e., they 
posited a similar number of hypotheses, but novices tested and discarded fewer). Further, novices’ 
approaches differed from those of experts in that novices verbalized fewer goals (goals have been 
defined as a desired change in state – see Newell & Simon, 1972) and more strategies.  However, 
novices’ strategies were top-down but weak; their strategic statements lacked specificity and detail. 
Experts’ strategies were more structured and bottom-up. Their strategic statements contained 
attainable specific steps, whereas novices’ statements were characterized as “lists of actions items” 
(Schenk et al., 1998, p. 33). 
 
Application domain knowledge, that is, the “real-world” domain that is the source of the problem that 
is being solved by the programming artifact, has also been extensively studied. Although it is not 
surprising that knowledge of the application domain is fundamental to systems analysis (Vitalari, 
1985), subsequent studies find it relevant to a variety of development tasks. In a study of end-user 
development, Mackay and Elam (1992) considered how novice and expert levels of healthcare 
planning knowledge (the application domain) and spreadsheet knowledge (the programming domain) 
impacted problem solving ability.  Their findings were consistent with earlier psychological studies of 
expertise in that experts utilized deep structure knowledge and a more forward problem-solving 
approach.  They concluded that the “ideal user is one who is very knowledgeable of the functional 
domain in which the decision of interest resides and who is also very experienced with the software 
itself” (Mackay & Elam, 1992, p. 168). Similarly, novice analysts were more effective at modeling 
when they were familiar with the application domain (Vessey & Conger, 1993). They relied upon a 
general theory of mental models (mental models are a type of internal mental representation, see 
Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Perrig & Kintsch, 1985) to predict differences in novice analysts’ 
performance.  Knowledge of the application domain predicted which of two comprehension processes 
programmers used to understand a computer program (Shaft & Vessey, 1995). Shaft and Vessey 
(1995) contrasted theories of computer program comprehension: “top-down” hypothesis-driven 
(Brooks, 1977) and inferential, “bottom-up” theory (Shneiderman & Mayer, 1979). Subsequent work 
considered how use of a comprehension process influenced the type of knowledge (programming 
versus application domain) referenced as well as the effect on comprehension (Shaft & Vessey, 
1998). The three IS studies cited above all relied upon verbal protocol analysis.  Task performance 
was also examined in the Mackay and Elam (1992) and Vessey and Conger (1993) studies.  Shaft 
and Vessey (1998) also measured comprehension via responses to questions. These studies indicate 
that task performance cannot be explained by knowledge alone, but rather requires consideration of 
cognitive processes to understand how knowledge is applied. 
 
Kim and Lerch (1997) investigated writing a program. Their theoretical perspective relies upon cognitive 
theories of scientific discovery, modified to consider the representation space. The representation space 
is a mental model that encodes the programmer's current understanding of the target problem 
(Letovsky, 1986) and can be considered a type of knowledge structure. Programmers changed 
representations to lessen the cognitive difficulty (the process) of program generation or testing.  Based 
upon analysis of verbal and program protocols, they conclude that representation (knowledge structure) 
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changes happen suddenly. This study highlights the interplay between cognitive processes and 
knowledge structures. In addition, the observation that programmers changed their representations to 
lessen cognitive difficulty is consistent with cognitive fit arguments that a mental representation that 
does not fit the nature of a task requires the problem solver (e.g., a software developer) to transform his 
or her mental representation to facilitate problem solving (Vessey & Galletta, 1991). 
 
The theory of cognitive fit also permeates investigations regarding software developers’ knowledge.  
Shaft and Vessey (2006) found performance on a modification task was enhanced when maintainers 
worked in conditions that created cognitive fit.  Fit was operationalized as depending on the nature of 
the modification task and maintainer knowledge of the application domain. Khatri, Vessey, Ramesh, 
Clay, and Park (2006) use cognitive fit to establish theoretical differences in the role of application 
domain knowledge for different types of schema understanding tasks, which was found to be 
contingent on task type. Both studies conclude that researchers should consider the nature of the 
application domain and participants’ application domain knowledge in subsequent studies. 
 
Similar to our observation with regard to DEV-RQ1, the development of OOA motivated studies of 
software developers’ knowledge.  In this context, researchers considered the challenges of shifting 
from SD to OOA.  These studies focused on how knowledge of one development method eased or 
hindered the transition to the new OOA methodology (Sheetz et al., 1997; Nelson et al., 2009).  
Sheetz, Irwin, Tegarden, Nelson, and Monarchi (1997) investigate this issue via the elicitation of 
cognitive maps.  Nelson, Armstrong, and Nelson (2009) assess professional developers’ knowledge 
structures at different stages in the transition from SD to OOD to ascertain an understanding of the 
cognitive shifts necessary during this transition. 
 
Reuse, the application of existing software artifacts in the development of a new system (Irwin, 2002), 
has been little researched from a cognitive perspective within IS.  However, Irwin (2002) studied class 
reuse via verbal protocol and performance measures.  The focus was on how programmers utilized 
their knowledge to identify and apply an analogous solution.  Irwin borrowed from cognitive 
psychology, applying Gentner’s (1983) typology of analogical reasoning. 
 
A different take on understanding the knowledge to support software developers’ cognitions appears 
in recent work investigating how diagrams allow analysts to increase their knowledge of the domain 
(Burton-Jones & Meso, 2006).  Using the “good decomposition model” (GDM) (Wand & Weber, 1990) 
three versions of UML diagrams were generated with different levels of adherence to the GDM.  
Unlike earlier studies that operationalized the GDM for systems design, this study applied it to 
systems analysis. Developers who utilized the UML diagrams that most adhered to GDM 
demonstrated understanding of and problem solving within the domain.  These studies demonstrate a 
transition that we will observe later: viewing software development artifacts not solely as mechanisms 
to aid developers, but also as a means to develop the knowledge of those that rely upon them. 
 
The studies described in this section focused on the knowledge that software developers rely upon 
while engaged in developing software. The earliest studies focused on eliciting and specifying the 
nature of the knowledge.  Later studies, often through the applications of stronger theoretical models, 
linked specific types of knowledge to their support of different cognitive processes, including theories 
of program comprehension, analogical reasoning, or learning.  We summarize this stream of research 
with the following research question. 
 
DEV-RQ2: How does specialized knowledge enable developers’ cognition in creating 
representations? 
3.4. Knowledge Sharing in Software Development 
Although the earliest study we note (Sackman et al., 1968) called for investigations of programming 
teams, there has been relatively little cognitive research on collaborative issues (e.g., knowledge 
sharing and others aspects of distributed cognition) in software development. Of interest are the 
mental representations of both software developers and users (Figure 1). These studies focus more 
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on knowledge (Table 1) than on reasoning with representations. One fundamental collaboration is 
that between analyst and user to develop system requirements. This is a cognitive issue because at 
the core of understanding user requirements is a need to share knowledge between the user (or 
groups of users) and software developer(s). Despite its importance to software development, 
requirements development has not been subject to extensive research (Browne & Rogich, 2001). 
 
Above, we noted two studies focused on the knowledge of systems analysts (Vitalari, 1985; Schenk 
et al., 1998). Their focus was on individuals’ knowledge rather than the interaction and sharing of 
knowledge between an analyst and a user. Other studies, however, have sought to understand the 
analyst-user interaction required to develop requirements (Chakraborty, Sarkar, & Sarker, 2010; 
Majchrzak, Beath, & Lim, 2005; Marakas & Elam, 1998; Tan, 1994; Zmud, Anthony, & Stair, 1993).  
Many approaches have been employed to study this process: mock interviews with experimental 
confederates (Zmud et al., 1993), content analysis of audio and video tapes of interactions between 
professional systems analysts and clients (Tan, 1994), analysis of questions asked during interviews 
(Marakas & Elam, 1998), the theory of collaborative elaboration (Majchrzak et al., 2005), and 
grounded theory development based on interview data (Chakraborty et al., 2010). Despite the 
importance of requirements determination and ample historical motivation for its investigation, these 
studies appear somewhat piecemeal, achieving little coherence. 
 
Similar to what we noted in the previous section, a trend seems to be developing to consider the 
software representation (the IS itself or the documentation artifacts that exist in its context) as a 
means to shape the knowledge of those who use the system, rather than solely as support for 
development. Conceptual models can be a means for individuals to increase their knowledge about a 
business domain (Burton-Jones & Meso, 2008; Shanks, Tansley, Nuredini, Tobin, & Weber, 2008). 
Burton-Jones and Meso (2008) integrated the Multimedia Theory of Learning (Mayer, 2001) with 
decomposition quality (per GDM, Wand & Weber, 1990).  Having additional representations (i.e., text 
in addition to a conceptual model) enhanced novices’ learning about a domain.  Another interesting 
element of this study is the reliance on multi-media protocol data (screen-cam records, think aloud 
data, and Webcam videos of participants). Hence, although some studies in this time frame preferred 
to focus on knowledge structures (e.g., Shaft & Vessey, 2006), newer technology provided additional 
opportunities for considering process. 
 
Current trends in software development, such as pair programming and the reality of team-based 
software development, acknowledge the cognitive aspects of these endeavors. A few early 
investigations of software development teams considered how the mix of cognitive styles represented 
within a team related to system success (Brittain White, 1984; Kaiser & Bostrom, 1982). These studies 
relied upon the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and results indicated that a mix of cognitive styles 
can be beneficial to success and that different cognitive styles may be more or less beneficial 
depending upon the phase of the development life cycle (Brittain White & Leifer, 1986).  Not all studies 
have supported the argument that the mix of cognitive styles across a team explains systems 
development success (Nutt, 1986). Although some recent studies have investigated cognitive style in 
the context of effective software development teams (Gorla & Lam, 2004) and software developer job fit 
(Chilton, Hardgrave, & Armstrong, 2005), cognitive style has been not been a consistent focus of 
software development studies. The equivocal results or the timing of early cognitive style studies 
(shortly after Huber’s (1983) influential paper, which we discuss later) may have contributed to cognitive 
style being investigated sporadically.  However, with regard to software development teams, cognitive 
style, an individual difference variable, may have limited explanatory power and investigations of other 
cognitive issues – such as knowledge and process – are likely more informative . 
 
Some early studies of software development teams indicate that knowledge sharing occurs in many 
areas including the client’s requirements, development tools and languages, and so on (Curtis, 
Krasner, & Iscoe, 1988; Waltz, Elam, & Curtis, 1993). Shared knowledge of the task and of the team 
appear to be helpful to software development team coordination (Espinosa, Slaughter, Kraut, & 
Herbsleb, 2007). Knowledge sharing continues to be relevant post-implementation (Santhanam, 
Seligman, & Kang, 2007). The types of knowledge shared (know-why, know-how, and know-what) 
differed depending upon the role (user and help-desk personnel) and the direction of the knowledge 
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sharing.  There seems to be opportunity for studies exploring knowledge sharing and other aspects of 
distributed cognition in development. 
 
Despite the studies mentioned above, studies of pairs or SD teams rarely focus on shared cognition.  
This is perhaps surprising given that “[p]airing developers allows them to share knowledge and form a 
common understanding of the system and the development tasks” (Dawande, Johar, Kumar, & 
Mookerjee, 2008, p. 73). Ironically, these authors then take an analytical approach to develop 
module-developer assignments. Another study investigating pair programming offers a cognitive 
argument to explain performance on a programming task and finds that pairs’ performance was 
superior to the second-best member of the pair, but not the best member (Balijepally, Mahapatra, 
Nerur, & Price, 2009). They also examine perceptual measures of satisfaction and confidence in 
performance but do not examine cognitive processes explicitly. Focusing on performance is 
consistent with early SD studies (e.g., Shneiderman et al. 1977).  It will be interesting to see if studies 
of pairs and SD teams follow a trajectory similar to studies of individual software developers and 
begin to investigate cognition more directly, such as through verbal protocol data or a consideration of 
how the distribution of types of knowledge (e.g., programming, modeling, application domain, and so 
on) between a pair or across a software development team influences performance. Another issue 
that seems relevant to software development teams are what and how software development tools 
and techniques can facilitate shared cognition. 
 
Current work on boundary objects (Zmud & Lim, 2011) provides a theoretical lens for investigating the 
distributed cognition (especially knowledge sharing) needed to facilitate software development in 
organizational settings (e.g., Bergman, Lyytinen, & Mark, 2007). Boundary objects are artifacts that 
are useful in “bridging disparate knowledge structures” (Zmud & Lim, 2011) and include, but are not 
limited to, diagrams, prototypes, and methodologies. We summarize the above with the following 
enduring question: 
 
DEV-RQ3: How can software development tools, techniques, and boundary objects facilitate 
distributed cognition among development teams, users, and managers? 
3.5. Summary 
Table 2 provides a summary of the evolution of cognitive research in software development. While 
the efforts in this area began with little reference to theory, cognitive psychology as a reference 
discipline played an important role in addressing IS questions in software development. The evolution 
of software development technologies and methodologies creates a nearly endless opportunity for 
investigation. Early studies focused on changes in the implementation technology, such as the 
change to on-line programming environments (Sackman et al., 1968); that is, a change in the manner 
in which software developers interacted with the software itself. It might be argued that some of these 
early studies pre-date the development of IS as a field, given that MIS Quarterly was not established 
until 1977. From a historical perspective, however, these early software development studies created 
a foundation and focus if not on cognitive theories (which were emerging), then on the use of the 
experimental method. These studies were motivated by the underlying notion that software developer 
performance could be aided or hindered by how well different software development tools and 
techniques supported the cognitively complex task of software development. As theory evolved, this 
notion became articulated by the theory of cognitive fit: a representation (either an internal mental 
representation or a representation as embedded in a development artifact) that fit the task 
requirements would aid developers by reducing the cognitive load, or cognitive effort, associated with 
conducting the task. Consideration of knowledge structures was imperative to the development of 
cognitive fit theory. Not surprisingly, we note many studies, both prior to and since the theory of 
cognitive fit emerged, investigated software developers’ knowledge structures. These studies built on 
similar studies in cognitive psychology. Perhaps the clearest linkage is investigations of differences  
between novices and experts.  Performance differences between experts and novices are expected, 
and hence, somewhat uninteresting. Instead these studies investigated the nature of experts’ 
knowledge, its structure and application. The focus on knowledge and how it shapes the ability to 
conduct a development task continues to be important.  We note a recent trend to focus less on 
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individual and more on distributed cognition (i.e., beyond the individual). This focus is consistent with 
the nature of IS development work, which is nearly always collaborative, and also reflects recent 
theoretical work in distributed cognition. Software development artifacts applied as boundary objects 
can facilitate knowledge sharing and structure task environments. The studies in this section illustrate 
how the contexts and areas of interest evolved with technological developments. Nonetheless, 
underlying enduring questions are evident, and the full potential for cognitive research in this domain 
remains to be realized. 
 
Table 2. The Evolution of Cognitive Research in Software Development 
Time 
Period 












support tools,  
language 
constructs and  
programming 
practices 
On-line v. Off-line debugging (Sackman 
et al. 1968) 
Flowcharting (Shneiderman et al., 1977) 
Programming practices  









Expert debugging processes (Vessey, 
1985) 
Decision tables, decision trees, 
structured English to support 



















OO v. SD (Agarwal et al., 1996) 
Data modeling (Srinivasan & Te’eni, 
1995) 






















OO modeling (Kim et al., 2000)  
Causal map of maintenance knowledge 
(Nelson et al., 2000) 
Reuse (Irwin, 2002) 
Ontology (Wand & Weber, 2004) 
Cognitive fit of knowledge structures 
during maintenance (Shaft & Vessey, 
2006)  
Software development representations to 
increase developers’ knowledge (Burton-
Jones & Meso, 2006) 
User-analyst knowledge sharing 
(Charkaborty et al., 2010) 
4. Cognition and Decision Support  
4.1. Scope 
From the beginning the term “Decision Support Systems” (DSS) has been interpreted and defined in 
vastly different ways (Alter, 1977; Bonczek, Holsapple, & Whinston, 1981; Sprague, 1980; Sprague & 
Carlson, 1982). Like many terms in IS, the definition of a DSS did not arise from some theoretical 
foundation (such as an understanding of cognition in decision making), but rather from practice (see 
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Alter, 1977). Consistent across these definitions is the idea that DSS entail acquisition, organization, 
and use of knowledge representation in the support of semi-structured decision making (Keen & Scott 
Morton, 1978). Cognition is, thus, central to the nature of DSS, and a major research concern is how 
well the resulting “man-machine” (user-DSS) combination performs (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990). The 
essential role of cognition in DSS is evident from the early model-based DSS up to the latest 
business analytics tools where “comprehensible” outputs, clearly a matter of cognition, are a critical 
feature for success (Kohavi, Rothleder, & Simoudis, 2002). 
 
While the definition of DSS was informed more by understanding IS practice than psychological 
theory, the definitions and approaches were essentially consistent with cognitive psychology.  
Fundamentally, DSS recognize the bounded rationality of users, namely “… the psychological limits 
of the [human] organism (particularly with respect to computational and predictive ability” (Simon, 
1955, p. 101). As such, DSS are intended to compensate for human cognitive limitations, including 
biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 
While development and user interface issues have been an important part of the DSS literature 
(Arnott and Pervan, 2005), we address cognition in development and human-computer interaction 
elsewhere in this paper. In what follows, we explore the enduring IS questions of cognition within 
decision support rather than provide a review of the DSS literature per se (see Power (2007) for an 
historical overview or Arnott and Pervan (2005) for a recent critical analysis).   
4.2. A Question of Balance in DSS:  Models vs. Users 
As Simon (1978, p. 479) notes, “humans and computers do not have the same strengths”. As far 
back as the 1950s, it was recognized that they can be complementary (Simon, 1955). Similarly, the 
question of cognition and judgment in the use of quantitative models has been an interest in the 
psychology literature (Meehl, 1954) since before the invention of computer-based DSS.  This 
question persists in psychology, as the title of Kleinmuntz’s (1990) article reveals: “Why we still use 
our heads instead of formulas: Toward an Integrative Approach”.  Even after more than 30 years of 
consideration, Kleinmuntz believes psychology is still only moving “toward” an approach (Kleinmuntz, 
1990).  Further, it remains a contentious issue in the practice of psychology (Salzinger, 2005). 
 
The balance issue moves from a psychological question to an IS question when the model 
(“representation”) is embedded in a DSS.  Indeed, Alter (1977, p 41) categorized DSS based on the 
“degree to which the system’s outputs could directly determine the decision”.  Technologically, early 
DSS were primarily focused on providing access to quantitative models; later activity would move to 
non-quantitative representations. Four of the seven types of DSS in Alter’s (1977) taxonomy have 
“models” in their name. 
 
From a task perspective, much of the early DSS work focused on planning contexts. For example, the 
Minnesota Experiments employed simulators for production, procurement, and inventory control 
(Dickson et al., 1977). Indeed, the production planning context persisted as a stalwart for 30 years 
(e.g., Davis & Kottemann, 1995; Goodwin, 2005). While this facilitates building a cumulative research 
tradition (Keen, 1980) by enabling greater comparability across studies, it can also lead to research 
being viewed as “old hat” because the task context is not novel. The mutual influence of context 
demands and technology advances in early DSS developments is excellently captured by Keen and 
Scott Morton (1978): 
 
As the technology advanced ... many organizations had also to adjust to an increasingly 
unpredictable environment.  ... organizations began, in a piecemeal fashion, to exploit 
the opportunities the new technology provided and built small interactive systems and 
models to help them in their planning (p. 4). 
 
The notion of interactivity is important here. It is a technological change, but more importantly it 
changed the nature of how the users cognitively engaged with the IS. Indeed the importance of 
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understanding interactivity persists to the present day, as we shall see later as we look to the future of 
cognitive research (Section 4). 
 
Interactive use of computer-based models brings challenges that require consideration and analysis 
of user cognition. Examining this issue, Dickmeyer (1983) contrasted the provision of an interactive 
model with a static forecast printout and found greater changes in users’ policy decisions in the 
interactive condition.  Similarly, McIntyre (1982) found greater volatility in performance for DSS users.  
Further, users of an interactive DSS performed better but took longer, suggesting that interactivity 
provided better but less efficient decision making (Benbasat & Schroeder, 1977). In contrast, 
enhanced interactivity that the DSS provides can be harmful to performance (Kottemann, Davis, & 
remus, 1994). As Farwell (1984, p. 72) notes, DSS requires: “a balance to be struck between the 
computer's calculation and logic capabilities and the freewheeling judgment of its human operator”. 
The enduring DSS and cognitive research question evidenced is: 
 
DSS-RQ1: How can a balance between user cognition and computer-based 
representations be achieved so as to maximize performance with a DSS? 
 
Notably, an appropriate balance does not necessarily mean optimal, as some task contexts may not 
have a normatively correct choice or judgment, even ex post.  The issue of balance has been evident 
in DSS research for many years (e.g., Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Davis & Kottemann, 1995; Hoch & 
Schkade, 1998; Jones & Brown, 2002) and continues to be of interest (e.g., Arnold, Clark, Collier, 
Leech, & Sutton, 2006; Kayande, De Bruyn, Lilien, Rangaswamy, & van Bruggen, 2009; Mascha & 
Smedley, 2007).  Indeed, some authors have expressed a concern for technology dominance in that 
a user may defer judgment inappropriately to the technology even in the face of significant economic 
and legal consequences (Arnold & Sutton, 1998; Hampton, 2005). 
4.3. Cognitive Style and DSS 
Cognitive theories and concepts were initially introduced into DSS research with Mason and Mitroff’s 
(1973, p. 475) seminal definition of an IS as comprising: 
 
at least, a PERSON of a certain PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE who faces a PROBLEM within 
some ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT for which he needs EVIDENCE to arrive at a solution, 
where evidence is made available through some MODE of PRESENTATION. 
 
Not surprisingly, the reference to the importance of the user’s psychological type led to the 
introduction and rapid growth of the experimental method in IS research, notably marked by the 
“Minnesota Experiments” (Dickson et al., 1977). Mason and Mitroff (1973) defined psychological type 
as cognitive style, and hence, cognitive style became a central variable in DSS experiments 
conducted at the time (Benbasat & Taylor, 1978).The focus on “type” played into a contingency view 
of cognitive attributes of users, which no doubt contributed to its popularity, as it was the heyday of 
contingency research in the organizational studies arena. 
 
Cognitive style refers to an individual’s approach to information acquisition, analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation (Sage, 1981). It is most commonly conceptualized as two contrasting extremes:  
analytical versus heuristic/intuitive (Huysmans, 1970), or via a Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
(for a recent IS example, see Barkhi, 2002), or through a direct reference to physiology of the brain 
and hemispherical specialization (e.g., Robey & Taggart, 1982). 
 
In the 1970s and early ’80s there was a burgeoning interest in cognitive style research (e.g., Bariff & 
Lusk, 1977; Benbasat & Taylor, 1978; Henderson & Nutt, 1980; Lusk & Kersnick, 1979). However, 
the proliferation of interest in cognitive style proved problematic.  Most notable was Huber’s (1983) 
well-known critique. In his pejoratively titled paper, “Cognitive Style as a Basis for MIS and DSS 
Designs: Much ado about nothing?”, Huber argued that cognitive style could not form the basis for 
guidelines for DSS design. Further, future cognitive style research was unlikely to yield guidelines for 
design. To support these claims Huber cited a multitude of factors, including inconsistent empirical 
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results and measures, lack of theory, but most fundamentally that “we do not know if DSS designs 
should (1) conform to the user’s cognitive style or (2) complement [it]” (Huber, 1983, p. 571). 
 
In hindsight, we can see that Huber’s (1983) critique recognized that the cognitive style research 
failed to address the enduring questions of the field. Specifically, the research could not provide 
guidance as to the balance between computer-based models and managerial cognition (DSS-RQ1) 
nor could it adequately address the design imperative in the other cognitive research questions that 
emerged (see DSS-RQ2 and DSS-RQ3 below). 
 
From a historical perspective, we can observe that the rise and fall of cognitive style research was 
more fundamentally problematic than a failure to adequately address the design imperative. In its 
rise, cognitive style research in IS became de facto synonymous with cognitive research in IS in 
general. Thus, Huber’s (1983) treatise that ended cognitive style research also curtailed interest in 
cognitive research in IS more broadly. The fundamental problem was that cognitive style was an 
individual difference variable, “it categorizes individual habits and strategies at a fairly broad level and 
essentially views problem solving behavior as a personality variable” (Keen & Scott Morton, 1978, p. 
74). Yet, cognitive psychology is not about personality, it is about the “activity of knowing: the 
acquisition, organization and use of knowledge” (Neisser, 1976, p. 1). Huber’s (1983) article curtailed 
future cognitive style research, but unfortunately also impacted all cognitive research in IS, including 
research that was not focused on individual personality differences. Indeed, it possibly contributed to 
the relative lack of interest in cognition in the Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) literature, 
which was in its infancy at the time of Huber’s critique (although, this may have been due to the 
absence of adequate theories of group cognition at the time, which we discuss below). 
4.4. Toward a Process View 
Ramaprasad (1987) attempted to re-direct the field away from cognitive style to a focus on cognition 
and cognitive processes. More than just a response to Huber’s critique, the call for a focus on 
cognitive processes was consistent with the broader psychological literature; for example, Payne’s 
(1976, p. 368) lament in the psychology literature that “most research on decision behavior has 
focused on data which reflect only the end product of decision processes”. There was a need for a 
richer view of user cognition and behavior with DSS, and the enduring question emerged: 
 
DSS-RQ2: How do DSS design characteristics impact user cognitive processes and 
performance? 
 
Pracht and Courtney (1988) sought to direct research toward issues of cognitive ability and cognitive 
processes in understanding performance with DSS. Their work is particularly notable in that it 
highlights a distinction between two phases of decision making:  problem formulation or structuring 
and problem analysis (see also Paradice & Courtney, 1986). Indeed, the notion of decision support 
occurring by structuring the decision problem is one that persists through to the present (e.g., 
Mennecke, Crossland, & Killingsworth, 2000; Phillips-Wren, Mora, Gorgionne, & Gupta, 2009), 
perhaps no more so than in the twin concepts of Decisional Guidance and System Restrictiveness, 
which Silver defines as: 
 
Decisional Guidance: the degree to which and the manner in which a Decision Support 
System guides its users in constructing and executing decision-making processes, by 
assisting them in choosing and using its operators.  (Silver, 1990, p. 57) 
 
System restrictiveness: the degree to which and the manner in which a DSS restricts its 
users’ decision-making processes to a particular subset of all possible processes.  
(Silver, 1988, p. 52) 
 
From the perspective of our DSS research questions, guidance and restrictiveness are key design 
characteristics that may affect user cognition (DSS-RQ2) and, as a consequence, the appropriate 
balance between user and models (DSS—RQ1). 
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Empirically, Decisional Guidance has been found to influence user decision processes and key 
outcome variables including efficiency, decision quality, user learning, and satisfaction (e.g., Jiang & 
Klein, 2000; Parikh, Fazlollahi, & Verma, 2001; Singh, 1998).  However, the Decisional Guidance 
literature has been plagued somewhat by the variety of different forms that guidance can take 
theoretically, and the even greater variety in how those forms are operationalized (Parikh et al., 
2001). For example, in an Expert Systems (ES) context, Davern and Parkes (2010) find that the 
taxonomy of types of guidance appears to be incommensurable with a well-established taxonomy of 
the forms of explanation mechanism in ES (Gregor & Benbasat, 1999). Regardless, explanation 
mechanisms are a prime practical example of deliberate decisional guidance. In parallel there is 
some work in IS (e.g., Bui & Lobbecke, 1996; Kayande et al., 2009; Te’eni, 1991), and a large body of 
work in psychology examining the role of feedback in judgment and decision making (see Cooksey, 
1996, for a review). How this reconciles with work on Decisional Guidance remains unclear. 
 
Empirically users seem to prefer less restrictive DSS (Wang & Benbasat, 2009), although the 
performance impacts are less clear. Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence, & Stephens, (2011) find no benefit for 
restrictiveness in a context where the expectation was that restrictiveness would be helpful.  Davern and 
Kamis (2010) find users of a more restrictive DSS sometimes outperforming those relying upon a less 
restrictive DSS, although the expectation was that restrictiveness would hurt performance. There is 
clearly scope for more work exploring user cognition and system restrictiveness. 
 
The increased concern for process in DSS research is also evident in applications of the effort-
accuracy framework (see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993, for a detailed review of the framework).  
Whereas decisional guidance and system restrictiveness are introduced as design attributes of DSS 
that impact cognitive processes, the effort/accuracy work started from a psychological theory and 
sought design implications. The effort-accuracy paradigm in behavioral decision theory holds that 
individuals use a variety of decision strategies (Johnson & Payne, 1985) and that the chosen strategy 
is a trade-off between the cognitive effort required to execute it and the expected accuracy obtainable 
from application of the strategy (Payne et al., 1993). In introducing the theory to DSS research, Todd 
and Benbasat (1991, p. 90) note: 
 
For DSS researchers, the key message to be taken from this work is that decision 
makers are not solely concerned with decision quality, a factor which has been the main 
focus of most DSS research to date.  Effort considerations can influence the choice of a 
decision making strategy and as a result decision quality. 
 
Todd and Benbasat’s (1991) comment reflects the shift from DSS-RQ1, where the focus was 
primarily on decision quality, to an expanded view considering the impact of DSS design 
characteristics on user decision processes (i.e., the chosen decision making strategy) and task 
performance (i.e., decision quality), per DSS-RQ2. More pointedly, Todd and Benbasat (1999, p. 356) 
illustrate the centrality of DSS-RQ1 and DSS-RQ2 to the effort accuracy work, as they seek to 
address two issues: 
 
1) the conditions under which DSS use leads to effectiveness or efficiency outcomes, 
and 2) the means by which the DSS designer could influence the behavior of the user, 
and what the extent of this intervention should be. 
 
Many papers have employed the effort-accuracy paradigm in their theoretical foundations (Davern & 
Kamis, 2010; Benbasat & Todd, 1996; Song, Jones, & Gudigantala, 2007; Todd & Benbasat, 1991, 
1992, 1994a, 1994b; Wang & Benbasat, 2009). Their results suggest that DSS enhance performance 
by reducing the effort required to employ a more accurate or effective decision-making strategy. 
There are interesting subtleties here, such as the finding that effort/accuracy trade-offs can persist in 
the face of incentives (Todd & Benbasat, 1999), and that the trade-off may operate with a decision 
quality threshold (Chu & Spires, 2000). 
 
The relative success of this stream of research can be attributed to multiple factors. The existence of 
a strong theoretical basis outside IS and strong methodological basis presented within the IS 
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literature was certainly contributory. For example, Todd and Benbasat (1987) catalog five different 
methods for “process tracing” including concurrent verbal protocols for which the article is perhaps 
best known.  There has also been methodological sophistication in the measurement of accuracy, for 
example using Data Envelopment Analysis (Davern & Kamis, 2010).  More pragmatically, the rise of 
e-commerce and the interest in supporting consumer decision making (for recent examples see 
Davern & Kamis, 2010; Tan, Teo, & Benbasat, 2010; Wang & Benbasat, 2009) added to the longevity 
of effort/accuracy work, without which the experimental tasks employed in the research would appear 
to be of far less topical significance. 
 
While the tenets of a cognitive cost/benefit framework continue to be referenced in the current 
literature, its role has become less central. For example, Tan et al. (2010) adopt a “resource-matching 
approach” (cognitive resources matching task demands – an issue of cognitive fit, albeit somewhat 
different to Vessey’s concept described above), whereas Davern and Kamis (2010) explore the role 
of domain knowledge in DSS; but both studies to varying degrees build off the effort/accuracy work.  
More broadly, the framework has also informed other conceptual developments that have had some 
bearing on DSS research, notably the work on Cognitive Fit (Vessey, 1991; Vessey & Galletta, 1991) 
and Task Technology Fit (Goodhue, 1995; Goodhue & Thompson, 1995). In the case of the task-
technology fit, studies have generally not been concerned with issues of cognition (but see Davern, 
1996, 2007). While this is clearly not the case for cognitive fit, the application contexts have been 
more around HCI and software development than DSS. 
4.5. Sharing Knowledge Beyond the Individual 
In parallel to developments with more traditional DSS, the field expanded in the 1980s to include 
expert systems (ES), a technology itself coming from an area of cognitive science (in the broad sense 
of the term) – Artificial Intelligence. Despite this connection to cognition, much of the early ES 
research focused on issues of implementation (Duchessi & O’Keefe, 1992, 1995; Yoon, Guimaraes, 
& O’Neal, 1995), although, see Ye and Johnson (1995) for an example of cognitive ES research. 
Later research became more concerned with understanding cognition to influence ES design. For 
example Arnold et al. (2006) look at different explanation systems and how experts versus novices 
rely on system recommendations as a result. Gregor and Benbasat (1999, p. 497) observe that 
“explanations, when suitably designed, have been shown to improve performance and learning and 
result in more positive user perceptions of a system” (see also Einning & Dorr, 1991). Notably, Gregor 
and Benbasat (1999) identify cognitive effort as critical in determining what is “suitably designed” (see 
also Dhawihal & Benbasat, 1996; Mao & Benbasat, 2000). Thus, DSS-RQ2 has persisted into the ES 
research, albeit in a somewhat different manner. 
 
In the last decade interest in ES has waned. In part this is reflective of the technology becoming 
embedded in other systems (Metaxiotis & Psarras, 2003). While ES research in IS was “rebadged” 
with papers preferring the term “knowledge based systems” rather than ES (see for example, Arnold 
et al., 2006; Gregor, 2001; Gregor & Benbasat, 1999; Hendriks & Vrien, 1999; Mao & Benbasat, 
2000; Nah & Benbasat, 2004). The rise of the term “knowledge based system” runs almost parallel 
with the recognition of knowledge management as a strategically important area of business practice 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Nonaka, 1991). We discuss knowledge management and knowledge 
management systems further below. 
 
Concurrently with the rise of ES, was the development of GDSS.  In 1987, DeSanctis and Gallupe’s 
foundational work on GDSS was published, citing both “technological advancements” and a “post-
industrial environment characterized by greater knowledge, complexity and turbulence” (p. 589) as 
influences. However, the GDSS literature had less interest in cognition, with a greater focus on 
interpersonal communication: “although support of cognitive processes of individual group members 
may be included in a GDSS, the primary aim of the group component of the system must be to alter 
the structure of interpersonal exchange” (p. 592). DeSanctis and Gallupe’s notions of Level 2 and 
Level 3 GDSS are pertinent here. Level 2 GDSS “provide decision modeling and group decision 
techniques aimed at reducing uncertainty and “noise” that occur in the group’s decision process” (p. 
593). Level 3 GDSS incorporate “machine-induced group communication patterns and can include 
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expert advice in the selecting and arrange of rules to be applied” (p. 594). These concepts at a group 
level are akin to the individual-level role of DSS in structuring tasks (Paradice & Courtney, 1986; 
Pracht & Courtney, 1988;) and studies of decisional guidance and system restrictiveness. 
 
A decade later, Nunamaker, Briggs, Mittleman, Vogel, & Balthazard (1997, p. 163) provided a review 
of “lessons from a dozen years of group support systems research”, which revealed much of the 
lessons learnt were more concerned with social interaction: for example, leadership style and 
appropriate voting mechanisms rather than a strong notion of group cognition. This is not surprising 
as the requisite theories of cognition had not yet been developed.  The concept of “distributed 
cognition”, in which cognition is viewed beyond the bounds of a single agent, did not gain recognition 
in the cognitive science literature until the seminal work of Hutchins (1995, 1991, 1990), nor had 
Weick’s (1995) or Weick and Roberts’ (1993) notions of collective mind and organizational 
sensemaking become broadly noticed until GDSS research was well under way. Consequently, the 
views of cognition in GDSS tended to focus on the individual-level cognitive phenomena (e.g., 
attention and memory (Potter & Balthazard, 2004) and information overload (Grise & Gallupe, 2000). 
 
A key goal of both GDSS and ES developments was sharing knowledge, an aspect of distributed 
cognition. With ES, this sharing was through the “transfer of expertise” via the system, whereas 
GDSS often served as a vehicle for sharing knowledge between the individuals and the group as a 
whole, with a view to enhancing problem solving.  The enduring IS question evidenced here is: 
 
DSS-RQ3: How can DSS enable distributed cognition between individuals and systems, 
and among groups and organizations? 
 
With the question framed in this manner, the issues endure beyond ES and GDSS technologies to 
knowledge management and business intelligence systems we discuss further below. While GDSS 
and ES researchers may not have framed their research in the terms of DSS-RQ3, the question is 
clearly consistent with the objectives of their research. This is evident both in the concern for 
determining appropriate design features, and the desire to improve individual, group, or 
organizational problem solving.  More broadly, the question was well recognized by Boland, Tenkasi, 
& Te’eni (1994, p. 456), who argued that: 
 
much of the effort to design information technology to support cognition in organizations 
has not addressed its distributed quality. Such systems have tended to focus either on 
the individual as an isolated decision maker, or on the group as a producer of a decision 
or policy statement in common. In distributed cognition, by contrast, the group is a set of 
autonomous agents who act independently yet recognize that they have 
interdependencies. 
 
Boland et al. place somewhat different demands on IT here. It is not about aiding an individual 
decision maker as in traditional DSS or ES contexts.  Nor is it about aiding a group as the decision 
making agent. Rather, it reflects the interdependencies among decision makers, and that the key is 
supporting the cognition of individual decision makers who are aware of their need to interact with 
others to achieve task objectives.  Notably, we can see this as IS re-defining again the nature of the 
term interaction, in a richer and more interesting manner: IT-enabled interactivity amongst decision 
makers. Similarly, we see expanded notions of fit arising in the group context (e.g., Dennis, Wixom, & 
Vandenberg, 2001; Zigurs & Buckland, 1998).  Progress in cognitive research in IS in the group and 
distributed context will entail connecting cognitive research with the broader social context to 
understand the use of IT for information sharing and knowledge sharing (e.g., consider Miranda & 
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4.6. Toward the Future 
Where, then, has decision support as an area moved in the 21st century?  In addition to the 
consumer-oriented DSS noted above, the two broad classes of technologies that seek to support 
decision making and problem solving are knowledge management systems (KMS) and business 
intelligence/business analytics tools (including OLAP).  
 
In a review of the knowledge management systems literature, Alavi and Leidner (2001) identify five 
broad research questions, looking in turn at knowledge creation, storage and retrieval, transfer and 
application. This is consistent with the earlier noted definition of cognition as “the activity of knowing: 
the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge” and involving both processes and knowledge 
structures. It seems that a KMS is essentially an IT tool to support cognition, particularly distributed 
cognition in an organization. The IT related questions Alavi and Leidner (2001) identify are thus 
consistent with DSS-RQ3 above, although all too often the theory and analysis is predominantly 
social or organizational rather than both cognitive and social. Indeed, Weick and Roberts (1993, p. 
368) lament regarding organizational cognition more broadly still seems apt, if not for organizational 
studies then at least for IS studies: 
 
Discussions of collective mental processes have been rare, despite the fact that people 
claim to be studying “social” cognition.  The preoccupation with individual cognition has 
left organizational theorists ill-equipped to do much more with the so-called cognitive 
revolution than apply it to organizational concerns, one brain at a time. 
 
Business intelligence (BI) (often used synonymously with business analytics, e.g., Wixom & 
Ariyachandra, 2011) refers to a broad range of technologies and tools for data analysis and reporting 
that inform and enhance the decision making of users  at a variety of levels in an organization 
(Elbashir, Collier, & Davern, 2008). While BI has become well established in practice, there is 
surprisingly little behavioral, let alone cognitive, research examining these tools. Indeed, Arnott and 
Pervan (2005) note as a serious concern the relatively low number of BI papers in the DSS research 
literature, suggesting it may be a critical crisis of relevance. Similarly, a survey for the BI Congress 
received responses such as “[f]or academics, BI is a fad at worst or a fashion at best.  In either case, 
it is not new and therefore does not garner the research focus of many” and “[t]he theoretical 
fundamentals in BI are very weak” (Wixom & Ariyachandra, 2011, p. 6).  Understanding cognition with 
BI tools provides a possible basis for more theoretically grounded BI research, and may assist in 
building a cumulative tradition, rather than providing commentary on the latest fad or fashion.  
Moreover, the plight of BI research highlights the importance of conceptual and theoretical 
developments in decision support research, rather than simply following changing task contexts and 
advances in technology. 
4.7. Summary 
Cognition has obviously played an important role in decision support studies in the IS literature.   Table 
3 provides a summary of the evolution of cognitive research in the decision support domain.  While the 
research literature has adapted to technological advancement and the changes in context of use and 
areas of interest, there is also evidence of gaps in the literature, and opportunities for future research. 
As noted above (and, hence, not shown in Table 3), there is relatively little cognitive research examining 
BI systems, despite their economic significance and widespread use. Similarly, there have been missed 
opportunities in regard to cognitive research extending beyond the individual-level analysis. The relative 
paucity of cognitive perspectives on GDSS and knowledge management systems is of note, despite the 
clear identification of the need to study IT-enabled distributed cognition (particularly, knowledge sharing) 
(e.g., Boland et al., 1994).  On a more positive note, we have seen the development within IS (rather 
than imported from psychology), of design-relevant concepts like decisional guidance and system 
restrictiveness in which cognition is central. We have seen powerful explanatory constructs such as 
cognitive fit emerge. In short, opportunities are abundant for future cognitive research in decision 
support, but the directions are challenging. Studying IT-enabled distributed cognition, for instance, may 
require moving outside the laboratory. Even within the laboratory, constructs like decisional guidance, 
while useful, have been difficult to operationalize consistently. 
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Table 3. The Evolution of Cognitive Research in Decision Support 
Time 
Period 
Context Theory and 
Concepts 
Areas of Interest Examples 
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Information overload in 
production  planning 
(Chervany & Dickson , 1974);  
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Process Tracing (Todd & 
Benbasat, 1987) 
Preferential choice (Todd & 
Benbasat, 1991, 1992, 1999) 
Task/Member proximity 
(DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987) 
Production Blocking  
(Gallupe, Cooper, Grise, & 
Bastianutti, 1994) 
Decision Support Theory 
(Silver, 1991) 
Learning by Novices (Eining & 
Dorr, 1991) 
Acceptance and  Types of 










Acceptance and e-commerce 
(Kafouris, 2002)  
Multi-attribute decisions in e-
commerce (Kamis, Koufrais, & 
Stern, 2008) 
5. Cognition in HCI 
5.1. Scope 
Human computer interaction (HCI), as studied within the field of IS, has traditionally focused on 
processes and outcomes of users interacting with computers to accomplish organizational tasks. One 
of the first research groups to embrace HCI was a series of symposia, beginning in 1986, called 
Human Factors in MIS, initiated by Jane Carey, which looked at human aspects of both users and 
developers. Furthermore, human factors included physical, cognitive, and affective aspects of human 
behavior. In this section, we look at cognitive aspects of users interacting with computers. Moreover, 
as suggested by Figure 1, we concentrate on the user’s interaction with the computer (the tool) that 
serves to advance some higher order task such as decision making (discussed in the previous 
section). 
 
Human interaction with computers is fundamentally a human activity of communication based on a 
flow of information, i.e., commands and messages, from the user to the computer and back to the 
user, for generating, using, and manipulating representations. By definition, therefore, it involves 
cognition as indicated in Figure 1. It is no surprise, therefore, that cognition has played a paramount 
role in understanding, modeling, and designing HCI. 
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5.2. Cognition and Performance 
Early HCI research in the 1970s experimented with different displays, both in print and on screen, to 
explore their impact on performance. Frameworks, such as that in Mason and Mitroff (1973), offered 
a list of relevant parameters, some of which were of interest to HCI, like psychological type and 
presentation mode. IS researchers explored the impact of various combinations of these variables, 
e.g., the fit between certain cognitive styles and presentation format (tables versus graphs). The 
inconclusive results and paucity of theoretical insights was frustrating and led to a near stop of 
research on cognitive styles, as noted earlier. The emergence of cognitive models, such as the 
popular keystroke model (Card et al., 1983), moved the research to theory-based experimentation 
with different designs.  As systems became more interactive, research concentrated on online work 
rather than off-line, and screen design rather than report designs. Interactive work stressed the 
cognitive difficulties resulting from the user's limited memory and processing capacity. 
 
Cognitive models were first applied to highly structured tasks (e.g., editing operations) and only later 
adapted to more complex tasks (e.g., working with a spreadsheet). Models of complexity (Berlyne, 
1971) were applied to decision-making tasks. HCI issues such as the use of windows to support 
complex tasks relied on complexity theory (Te'eni, 1989). Moreover, cognitive research looked into 
the process of interaction rather than only impact (Todd & Benbasat, 1987). This move to process 
was matched with the use of appropriate research methods such as protocol analysis. This mirrors a 
similar pattern we observed in the software development and decision support streams. 
 
The design implications were based on the assumption that designers should identify cognitive 
difficulties in performing the task and attempt to minimize them by careful design. In some cases, 
tables of “man better than machine” were used to allocate tasks between man and machine 
according to whether human cognition was better or worse than computer intelligence. But these 
characterizations were very general. Researchers proposed design methodologies that could 
systematically represent a particular task and identify the required cognitive resources as the basis 
for determining effective designs (Zachary, 1988). Research that considered how cognitive resources 
were used and how their limitations affected performance was, therefore, essential.  The research 
here in HCI clearly is related to the work discussed earlier in the context of DSS-RQ1, the difference 
here is the focus of interest in the interface and presentation of the IS rather than the underlying 
representation or decision model itself. 
 
The rapid technological advancements, reflected in higher interactivity and accessibility and, 
importantly, the evolving theoretical basis, underscored the enduring research question despite the 
changes in the type of task studied: 
 
HCI-RQ1: How do IT interfaces impact cognition and performance? 
 
Performance, as a function of cognition, was operationalized by the accuracy and efficiency of the 
task achievement. Tasks ranged from simple editing functions to complex planning and problem 
solving, but the general thesis was that limited cognitive resources produce better or worse 
performance according to the particular design. The realization that different designs produced 
different results for different tasks led to the idea of cognitive fit between computer presentation and 
task representation (Vessey & Galletta, 1991). Recall that mental representations (sometimes called 
cognitive models) explained how fit can be achieved. Here too, earlier studies compared the 
performance of different combinations of presentation and task and only later attempted to uncover 
the process of attaining fit and using it effectively. And again, to capture cognitive process, 
appropriate research techniques such as visual protocols were needed (Kennedy, Te’eni, & 
Treleavan, 1998).  Using such protocols, the researchers were able to break the user’s behavior into 
EIPs (elementary information processes) and calculate the optimal fit by minimizing cognitive effort. 
 
Cognitive fit implied customization of designs to specific tasks.  When taken further to include not only 
adaptation to task but also to the user, customization became personalization. The former research 
question expanded to underscore customization, in general, and personalization, in particular. 
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Technological advances made it easy to customize an interface to particular tasks (e.g., change the 
menu according to expected activity) and to particular users (e.g., adapt the online banking menu to a 
particular customer). Moreover, people have grown to expect such personalization in business, 
education and health. Thus, technology advancements and users’ expectations and norms of use, 
one feeding into the other, underscored the need to understand and design customization: 
 
HCI-RQ2: How does customizing/personalizing IT interfaces impact cognition and 
performance? 
 
The above two research questions have extended in several directions. First, new technologies, often 
coupled with new social expectations, have introduced new aspects of IT interfaces that “beg” to be 
studied. For example, HCI researchers have studied mobile IT and context-aware systems. In particular, 
highly interactive and highly vivid systems have drawn research on visualization and animation (e.g., 
Hess, Fuller, & Campbell, 2009; Zhang, 2000). Not only has the same research question been 
sustained, but some of the main theoretical models have been retained and extended, e.g., visualization 
based on cognitive fit (Goswami, Chan, & Kim, 2008). Second, the context of HCI has expanded. The 
context has evolved from a near confinement to tasks at the work place to include also tasks in the 
market place, particularly online consuming, which has accelerated since the 1990s, and more recently, 
to tasks in the social arena as well (Babu, Singh, & Ganesh, 2010; Hess et al., 2009). 
5.3. Beyond the Individual 
Research has progressed over the years from studying the individual interacting with a computer to 
examining several individuals working with computers in teams, to considering people communicating 
and working in communities. This move required new theory for understanding cognition in 
interpersonal situations. Some of the concepts on cognition could be used in computer-mediated 
interaction between individuals, while others had to be developed anew. A primary difference 
between an individual working alone with a computer and a dyad or group of individuals interacting 
via computers is the need for communicating. Earlier theories explaining the fit between 
communication and media such as media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986) and social presence 
theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) addressed cognition only marginally. Recent theories delve 
deeper into cognition. For example, similar to the notion of cognitive complexity in individual work, the 
notion of communication complexity explains communication outcomes (Te’eni, 2001). Moreover, as 
most computer-mediated communication occurred between people situated in remote locations, the 
impact of distance on cognition and ways IT can overcome the negative effects became an important 
research area (Olson & Olson, 2000). 
 
But there was another research issue that arose in communication and collaboration between 
individuals, namely, the question of how to support interaction between individuals with different 
perspectives. Research in HCI tackled this issue at two levels: 1) differences in perspectives that 
reflect differences in knowledge and attitude (see our earlier discussion of distributed cognition in 
DSS) and 2) differences in perspectives that reflect different physical views; for example, different 
displays and room settings in different locations or different groups of people in different locations. 
The latter aspect of perspectives required research on IT interfaces that bridged the gap between the 
different views by, say, showing multiple views on different screens or changing views according to 
who is speaking. It also highlighted the need for awareness of not only what is happening on the 
screen but what is happening with the people with whom the user is interacting. 
 
Here again, technological advances introduced new challenges. New communication technologies 
were different from e-mail. Wikis, blogging, and micro-blogging required new cognitive skills such as 
attention to huge amounts of information, high interactivity coupled with very short messages, and 
awareness of multiple others simultaneously, which underscored the importance of communication 
complexity, distance, perspectives, and awareness. Parallel to the technology advancements were 
the changing practices and norms of work. Increasingly, it has become popular and expected to work 
in teams, often cross-functional and international teams; to work in flatter, knowledge-intensive 
organizations; and to work in networks across organizations such as in communities of practice. 
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Thus, again, the combination of technology and norms has underscored the quest for going beyond 
the individual to understand distributed cognition:  
 
HCI-RQ3: How do IT interfaces impact distributed cognition between individuals and 
among groups, organizations, and communities? 
5.4. Beyond Performance, Beyond Cognition 
Cognitive research in HCI has, in part, moved to consider impacts beyond performance such as 
attitudes. Moreover, the last decade has seen a strong move to study cognition in conjunction with 
emotion, a move that strengthened in parallel to the continued trends mentioned above, namely 
advances in IT, the expanding context of HCI, and more interpersonal and community interaction with 
computers. As we have seen throughout our historical analysis, the enduring questions emerge more 
from the evolution of IS phenomena than from cognitive theory, although advances in cognitive 
research assist in providing an ever deepening understanding of IS phenomena. 
 
At the same time the first two research questions around cognition and performance were studied, 
HCI researchers engaged in the study of attitudes. The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was 
the most popular model used in IS (Davis, 1989), and was derived from the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). While attitudes are clearly influenced by cognition -- 
perceptions and beliefs – the link between cognition and HCI variables was not articulated in this 
stream of research. More recent treatments of TAM2 attempt to tie cognition into the model more 
closely (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Other research has sought the playfulness or "cognitive 
spontaneity” of IT use and its impacts on attitudes (e.g., Webster & Martocchio, 1992). Current 
research refers to cognitive aspects of, say, knowledge processing, but does not uncover cognition to 
the extent it can explain the impact of HCI on attitudes (e.g., Zhang, Scialdone, & Carey, 2009). We 
believe future research may extend and intensify this direction.  
 
Furthermore, the number of HCI studies on emotion more than quadrupled in the last decade versus 
the 1990s (this is the trend in the HCI literature outside IS too). More importantly, a growing number 
of studies combine cognition with emotion (e.g., Cyr, Head, Larios, & Pan, 2009; Deng & Poole, 
2010). As in the HCI field, in general, outside IS, researchers include emotion to explain users’ 
attitudes and choices in settings such as browsing and shopping in virtual stores. But emotion is 
strongly linked to cognition and, hence, we increasingly find more studies of both. Moreover, cognition 
and emotion are tied to attitudes, so we can expect HCI models that link cognition, affective emotions, 
and attitudes to explain behavior (e.g., Van den Heijden, 2004). 
 
At least in part, the growing interest in emotions stems from the expanding context of HCI, which is 
related to the dramatic increase in accessibility to the Internet and more recently to mobiles and smart 
phones. If people do not take to a particular website, they go to another; if consumers do not like to 
shop in one e-store, they turn to another. Hence emotions matter, in addition to cognition, and 
emotive designs are becoming the norm. Technological advancements for affective computing are 
evolving gradually (see, for example, the MIT media lab), but much can be done with current 
technology to improve the aesthetics and positive reactions to the interface. Furthermore, advances 
in research that combine cognition and emotion make it possible to extend cognitive HCI research to 
include emotions, too: 
 
HCI-RQ4: How do IT interfaces affect cognition and emotion and, thereby, attitudes and 
performance? 
5.5. Expanding to All Users, Extending Strengths 
The expansion of design goals from performance to satisfaction and to quality of life has paralleled an 
expansion to wider user populations, including the less gifted and less able (the principle of social 
responsibility). Cognition, of course, plays an essential role in understanding how to provide for all 
users. For example, designing for the blind requires creative designs that support cognition in the 
absence of sight (Babu et al., 2010). As IT becomes ubiquitous, we are expected to ensure digital 
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gaps do not worsen the position of the less advantaged, either interacting individually with computers 
or interacting with others through the Web and other systems. 
 
The HCI perspective of cognition elaborated above builds on models of human information-
processing that assume scarce cognitive resources. Different periods have emphasized different 
cognitive limitations. Human memory and information processing were especially relevant in earlier 
periods, while attention, awareness, and understanding vast amounts of information seem to be 
especially relevant currently. Nevertheless, the dominant perspective remains one of scarce cognitive 
resources, and, when the resources are over-taxed, cognition is impaired. It follows that IT should be 
designed to mitigate the demands on cognitive resources and the consequent difficulties; for 
example, reducing memory load or overcoming the impact of distance on poor awareness (Olson & 
Olson, 2000). Positive design, on the other hand, seeks to leverage the strengths of humans (Carroll, 
2010). For example, in some cases, generativity (the ability to originate, produce, or procreate) and 
not performance should be the preferred outcome (Avital & Te'eni, 2009): IT should be designed to 
enhance human creativity. To that end, designs that are evocative, adaptive, and open-ended, and 
the characteristics of IT that support these ends are preferred. For instance, two characteristics from 
an HCI-specific perspective are visualization and integration. Visualization enables users to see 
multiple dimensions, such as visual representations, providing the ability to see an object from 
multiple perspectives and to search for new insightful points of view. Similarly, integration enables 
linking and aligning interdependent domains, objects, or processes to provide the ability to overlay or 
merge views and to promote system-wide boundary crossing. This change in the research 
perspective, while not always applicable to systems supporting routine tasks, seems especially 
promising for dynamic, agile, diverse, and multi-national organizations. 
 
HCI-RQ5: How do IT interfaces enhance cognition for diverse individuals, groups, and 
communities?  
5.6. Summary 
Our central research questions have been shaped to a large extent by the combination of advances 
in IT, both in hardware and software, and changes in the norms and expectations of designing and 
using IT. The changes in norms and expectations are also reflected by the design goals of new IT, 
the new architecture, functionality, and interfaces of the systems. Earlier models of HCI were 
designed for performance in structured and repetitive tasks. Speed and error rate were the main 
performance parameters studied. Cognitive models (e.g., GOMS in Card et al.’s, 1983, keystroke 
model) were developed to predict speed and errors in simplified models of memory and processors.  
More advanced models were needed to cope with less structured tasks such as decision making, 
adapting performance to account for decision processes and outcomes (e.g., cost-benefit models and 
cognitive fit models). In the past 10 years, positive emotions in human computer interaction and 
positive attitudes toward systems have grown to be expected; cognition must be integrated with 
emotion to understand humans interacting to achieve these expanded goals. And more recently, the 
quality of life inside and outside the workplace and a positive design perspective on technology have 
introduced new, broader views of HCI that require new roles for cognition. Table 4 provides an 
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Images in websites and cultural 
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5. Synthesis and Future Directions 
5.1. From Enduring Questions to Cognitive Qualities 
We explored three distinct streams of IS cognitive research and identified enduring questions that 
characterize the programs of research in these streams. We expect that they will persist, as enduring 
questions, though they may evolve and be re-interpreted. However, appreciating past contributions 
more broadly and illuminating new vistas for research require a holistic synthesis across these 
streams. 
 
Building from the enduring questions, we sought to identify “Cognitive Qualities of IT” by exploring the 
common themes across the three streams and their enduring questions. We use the term cognitive 
qualities to refer to IT’s ability to affect cognitive processes and ultimately performance. Cognitive 
qualities are, thus, design-relevant aspects of IT. This potential is not simply a matter of design and 
implementation, but design and implementation with an understanding of cognitive processes.  
Cognitive qualities explain the relationship between the design and implementation of the IT artifact 
and task performance. We identify four key cognitive qualities of IT: interactivity, fit, cooperativity, and 
affordances.  We discuss these four cognitive qualities further below. 
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In both the HCI and DSS streams, we saw interactivity as a key cognitive quality.  For example, DSS-
RQ1’s concern with the balance between computer-based models (representations) and user 
cognition came to the fore with the introduction of interactive DSS.  In HCI, by definition, interactivity 
is a central idea.  Intuitively, the notion has meaning. More formally, it is a subject of some debate.  
For example, Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997, p. 1) define interactivity in the context of computer-
mediated communication as “the extent to which messages in a sequence relate to each other, and 
especially the extent to which later messages recount the relatedness of earlier messages”. 
 
Featherman, Wright, Thatcher, Zimmer, and Pak (2011, p. 3) define interactivity “as a consumer’s 
ability to manipulate objects in an online environment.”  Cognitively, interactivity implies a feedback 
loop of some form (e.g., in a sequence of messages, or in the manipulation of objects). Within 
development, the feedback loop of develop-test-refine has been present from the early days of 
programming. The desire for greater “interactivity” in development processes and tools is, thus, 
fundamental. For example, we can identify an interest in interactivity in the early comparisons of 
debugging in an online setting rather than  off-line coding and batch submission (e.g., Sackman et al., 
1968) -- which falls under the scope of DEV-RQ1. Thus, we find interactivity to be a key cognitive 
quality of IT evident in all three streams. 
 
Across all streams, the cognitive quality of fit played an important role. For example, in the software 
development arena this was evident in work examining factors (tools, techniques, and practices) that 
reduce the cognitive complexity of development (under the scope of DEV-RQ1). Cognitive fit between 
a maintenance task and the application domain knowledge of the maintainer was found to enhance 
performance (Khatri et al., 2006; Shaft & Vessey, 2006), which falls under the scope of DEV-RQ2.  
Theoretically, poor cognitive fit leads to greater effort, due to the need to transform representations.  
Within the scope of HCI-RQ1 and HCI-RQ5, cognitive fit was initially developed to address the graphs 
versus table debate and has subsequently been applied to address other interface design issues 
(Adipat, Zhang, & Zhou, 2011).  As an antecedent of effort, fit has bearing on the effort/accuracy work 
examined in conjunction with DSS-RQ2. Within the scope of DSS-RQ3, fit was explicitly introduced 
into the GDSS context (e.g., Dennis et al., 2001).  Although the use of fit here was broader than just 
cognitive, a major factor was the cognitive nature of the tasks (e.g., judgment versus sensemaking) 
(see also Zigurs & Buckland, 1998). Whether the original concept of cognitive fit (Vessey & Galletta, 
1991), or other cognitive perspectives on fit (e.g., see Davern, 2007, for a cognitive interpretation of 
Goodhue’s (1995) Task/Technology Fit), it is an important cognitive quality of IT. 
 
A common trend we observe is the shift from a focus on individual cognition to distributed cognition.  
We use the term “cooperativity” to describe the cognitive quality of IT that captures the extent to 
which IT supports and enables distributed cognition.  Our introduction of the term is intended to 
emphasize the importance of collaboration (between an individual and an IS or among individuals, 
groups, and communities through an IS) while recognizing, like interactivity, it is a cognitively relevant 
characteristic of IT design. 
 
Recall we defined distributed cognition (see Table 1) broadly to include knowledge sharing, 
collaborative task performance, shared mental models, shared cognition, and communication. 
Historically we see the growing focus on knowledge sharing and concern for supporting collaboration 
and groups (e.g., DEV-RQ3, DSS-RQ3, HCI-RQ3, and HCI-RQ5) as exemplifying the increased 
interest in design IT artifacts that exhibit cooperativity.  The HCI literature is perhaps most advanced 
in this regard;  explicitly recognizing distributed cognition as a foundation for research (Hollan et al., 
2000), and with a large body of work in computer-mediated communication. However, there is scope 
for further cognitive work on distributed cognition in development (e.g., pair programming, distributed 
development teams), and in decision support (e.g., knowledge management, business intelligence).  
Given the centrality of collaboration here, a future research focus on cooperativity as a cognitive 
quality of IT is one that also needs to understand the broader social context of behavior with IS as 
well as its connection with other psychological factors such as emotion and attitudes (per HCI-RQ4). 
Across all streams, we observe IT enabling performance by introducing structure to the tasks and 
environment in which cognition takes place, whether that cognition is about development, decision 
making, or interface manipulation. This structuring is not simply a matter of IT design; it is design with 
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an understanding of cognition – by our definition a cognitive quality of IT, which we label 
“affordances”, borrowing from Ecological Psychology. Affordances reflect a complementarity between 
an individual and the environment (Gibson, 1979).  A situation can afford a particular action for an 
individual with appropriate knowledge and abilities, and an individual can have the knowledge and 
abilities to carry out a particular action in an environment that affords such actions (Greeno, Moore, & 
Smith, 1993). As Kochevar (1994, p. 6) puts it: “Environments provide information structured to 
support specific behaviours, and adapted individuals are sensitive to such information patterns.”   We 
see evidence of this cognitive quality across the three research streams: for example, in the role of 
development techniques as providing affordances to facilitate building and maintenance of 
representations (per DEV-RQ1). Similarly, concepts like decisional guidance and system 
restrictiveness (which are encompassed by DSS-RQ2) are in effect about the design of the 
affordances for decision making with a DSS. Finally, HCI’s concern for customizing and personalizing 
interfaces (HCI-RQ2) and supporting diverse users (HCI-RQ5) are quite pointedly matters of the 
design of affordances – the complementarity between interface and user. Indeed, the design 
imperative underlying all of the RQs can be expressed as an issue of the design of affordances. It is 
perhaps not surprising then that the term affordance has already appeared in the IS literature (e.g., 
Davern, 1996; Markus & Silver, 2008) and is quite well-known in the HCI literature (e.g., Norman, 
1988). 
 
In our synthesis across the three streams, we identified four cognitive qualities of IT: interactivity, fit, 
cooperativity, and affordances. We cannot claim that this list is exhaustive, as it is derived from our 
historical analysis and, therefore, limited by the scope of our history. Moreover, these cognitive 
qualities are not necessarily distinct, but are interrelated. For example, affordances may impact fit and 
interactivity, which, in turn, may influence cooperativity. 
 
As the enduring questions provide a means to organize the research within each stream, the 
cognitive qualities provide a basis to examine the history (and future) of cognitive research in IS.  
Table 5 details the four cognitive qualities we identified and how they relate to IS contexts, and our 
conceptualization of IS as representations. 
 
Table 5. The Cognitive Qualities of IT 
Cognitive 
Quality 
Examples of IT 
attributes Representations IS Contexts and Concepts 
Interactivity Fast response time, 
immediate feedback  
Engaging with 
representations 
Interactive decision support, social media 
and communications 
Fit Match between 
quantitative graphics and 
type of decision task 
The relationship between 
representations 
Cognitive Fit, task-technology fit 
Cooperativity Applications and 
connectivity to exchange 
graphics and photos, 
ability to translate 
messages 
The sharing of 
representations 
Group decision support, knowledge 
management systems, pair programming 
distributed development, transactive 
memory, shared mental models 




constraints and enablers 
System restrictiveness, decisional 
guidance, systems development 
methodologies, information presentation 
format 
 
As technology evolved, the context of use changed, and the manner in which cognitive qualities 
manifest themselves changed also. Table 6 describes this evolution for interactivity across the areas 
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of research we examined. For example, DSS research examined the effect of interactivity on 
feedback designed to achieve more effective decision making and moved to considering enabling 
interactivity between multiple users. Similarly, in development, the IT-enabled interactivity evolved 
from batch, to online, to interactively enabling distributed development (such as geographically 
distributed designers working on a shared virtual representation of a system to be developed). 
 
Table 6. Illustrating the Evolution of a Cognitive Quality of IT – Interactivity 
Period IT 
Nature of Interactivity 
SD DSS HCI 
1960s Mainframes Programmers submit 
code and receive error 
report/execution 
results. 












line and receive error 
feedback/ execution 
results in real-time. 
Decision makers 
interact directly with 
DSS models (e.g., 
what-if scenarios). 
User base expands, a 
broader base of users 
interact with systems.  
The introduction of 






Interacting with more 
modular code. 
Decision makers begin 
to interact through DSS 
(GDSS) 
Interacting with 
systems to find 
information. 
1990s The Web 
and Global 
Networking 
Interacting with code 







systems through to 
knowledge 
management systems 
(interacting with the 
knowledge of others 
through IT) 
Consumer and general 
public interactions with 
IT 





open source):  
Interacting with others 
about code and design. 





Interacting globally to 
share knowledge 
Social interaction to 
develop collaborations, 
relationships, and 
communities of practice 
5.2. The Future of Cognitive Research 
As technology advances and new contexts of use emerge, we expect that the manner in which the 
cognitive qualities manifest themselves will evolve. Within the context of the three streams of 
research we analyzed, we see an exciting future in which the interplay among the different cognitive 
qualities provides an understanding of the development and use of IS in rich and meaningful 
contexts.  For example, consider interactivity in conjunction with affordances and cooperativity: 
understanding and generating new knowledge from the interaction between people, between people 
and their environment, including the technologies with which they interact and how they structure the 
interactions between people, and people and the environment. Cognition will, thus, be distributed 
among people, organizations, and IT – an integration of knowledge residing in distributed agents that 
comes together in a hermeneutic dialog. The success of these combinations of interactivity, 
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affordances, and cooperativity will very much be a matter of fit; the fit between system representations 
and mental representations in individuals or distributed across groups, and the fit between the 
representations of the task environment and these individual or distributed representations. 
 
From an HCI perspective, we see these issues arising from the ubiquity of online information and the 
rapid communication enabled by social media. In the DSS context, we identified knowledge 
management systems and BI as areas in which cognitive studies are underrepresented. For 
development, understanding the distributed cognition in the context of open source development 
practices, and other contemporary development strategies, seems fertile ground. 
 
Our view of the future of cognitive research is in contrast and complementary to the recent interest in 
NeuroIS: the application of neuroscience theories, methods, and tools in IS research (Dimoka, 
Pavlou, & Davis, 2007). Notably, the proposed research agendas for NeuroIS include all three 
subareas addressed in this manuscript (Dimoka et al., forthcoming; Dimoka et al., 2007; Riedl, 
Banker, Benbasat, Davis, & Dennis, 2010). NeuroIS and Cognitive IS research are complementary in 
much the same way as an understanding function of hardware complements and an understanding of 
software capabilities and performance (McClamrock, 1995). The two perspectives are at different 
levels of analysis.  In historical terms, the rise of NeuroIS is somewhat intriguing, given early work in 
IS rejecting the value of neuroscience in informing design with Rao, Jacob, and Frank (1992, p. 149) 
providing “evidence against the use of the microscopic approach of neuroscience for providing 
theoretical foundations for DSS and human-machine interface design guidelines”. Further they 
suggest, “the focus should instead be on psychological issues where cognitive functions are studied 
independently of their physical implementation. Research on cognitive functions should be carried out 
in terms of their high-level characteristics rather than micro-organization”. 
 
While Rao’s critique may be overly harsh given the advances in neuroscience since 1992, it highlights 
the need to carefully distinguish the potential contributions of NeuroIS and cognitive research in IS.  
Whereas NeuroIS by technological and economic necessity operates at the individual level (imaging 
brain activity is expensive and a one-subject-at-a-time activity), we see distributed cognition as 
increasingly the foundation for cognitive IS research that goes beyond the individual and investigates 
richer and more contextualized environments. 
 
The future direction of cognitive research in IS requires a shift in the mix of methods employed from 
the almost universal experimental study of cognition to the incorporation of field work.  On the one 
hand, this can imply the sort of cognitive anthropology best illustrated by Hutchins (1995), but not 
exclusively so (see Davern, Mantena, & Stohr, 2008, for an example of the use of cognitive theory to 
explore archival field data). It does not spell the demise of the experimental approach, only that we 
more effectively capture the richness of the environment in the lab (while recognizing the concomitant 
challenges to internal validity). As in the past, IS research can draw from cognitive psychology for 
insight. For example, the field of ecological psychology, which still makes abundant use of 
experiments, views behavior formally as an emergent product of the interaction between an individual 
and his or her environment (Gibson, 1979). The challenge is developing further IS cognitive theories 
that can adequately capture the richness of the information environment we now operate in, and also 
reflect the dynamics of emergent behaviors. Inevitably, this will require a broader view of cognition 
and recognizing its connections to other drivers of behavior such as emotion and attitudes. 
 
In addition to investigating the role of more diverse contexts, another fruitful area for IS researchers 
could be developing technologies and techniques based on cognitive theories. Cognitive researchers 
in IS have frequently examined new technologies and methods. They have less frequently used 
cognitive theory to drive the creation of tools and techniques. There are examples of such work. Kim 
et al. (2000) created a new diagramming technique based upon cognitive theory. Similarly, using the 
GDM, Buton-Jones and Meso (2006) created and compared different modeling grammars.  Such 
efforts could span the DSS and HCI arenas. As “design research” gains momentum, cognitively-
driven design research could be an important direction for cognitive IS research. Certainly, the 
enduring questions we consider across the three streams reflect an underlying intent to provide 
guidance to design. Moreover, the cognitive qualities of IT we have identified provide potentially 
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powerful lenses for cognitive theory-driven design research. Indeed, we see the design task as 
operationalizing and implementing the different cognitive qualities of IT we have identified. 
5.3. Limitations and Future Histories 
In this historical analysis, we concentrated on the development of the substantive content of cognitive 
research in IS. We showed how technological advancements in the cognitive qualities of IT and the 
changing and expanding context of how the technology is used directed the research issues studied.  
We did not attempt to examine the motivations, practices, or social contexts of the researchers. One 
could argue that an analysis of networks of researchers may also contribute to understanding why 
and how cognitive research evolved. For instance, many IS researchers participated in conferences 
and published in journals outside IS (in our analysis we focused on mainstream IS journals, except for 
the earliest work when such journals did not exist). However, researchers of cognition in IS may 
participate in a variety of conferences as well as publish in specialized and non-IS journals.  
Specialized conferences and publications differ from IS conferences and publications in the 
requirements and expectations of the role of theory, method, and contribution in research. It might be 
interesting to examine the impact of this duality on researchers and their published work.  A co-
citation analysis, for instance, might help us understand if research in the specialized outlets has 
influenced the research of others in mainstream IS, and vice versa, and whether the researchers 
common to both networks serve as boundary spanners to spread the word in both directions. We 
encourage future accounts to consider this complementary perspective. 
6. Conclusion 
Our history of cognitive research in IS demonstrates that cognition topics have been a significant 
focus in IS research. Reflecting on this history, we exposed some of the influences on the evolution of 
cognitive research in IS across three areas: software development, decision support, and human-
computer interaction.  Just as it is clear that cognitive research has made a substantial contribution to 
IS, it is also clear that it has potential for future contribution. This is evident in the enduring questions 
we identified and in the cognitive qualities of IT we described above.  Furthermore, extrapolating from 
our historical analysis, we postulate a robust future for cognitive research in IS: a future that is more 
contextually bound and, thus, even more relevant; a future that is more dynamic and, thus, more 
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